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There is mixed evidence whether reflecting on an existential threat increases negative
affect and thereby elicits subjective arousal and physiological activation. Additionally,
it is debated whether different existential and non-existential threats elicit different
arousal responses, although systematic comparisons are lacking. The current study
explored affective, subjective, and physiological arousal responses while comparing
several existential threats with a non-existential threat and with a control condition.
One-hundred-and-seventy-one undergraduate students were randomly allocated to
one of four existential threat conditions: mortality salience (MS), freedom restriction,
uncontrollability, and uncertainty; or to the non-existential threat condition: social-
evaluative threat (SET); or to a control condition (TV salience). Self-reported
positive/negative affect was measured before and after reflection, while subjective
arousal and physiological activation (electrodermal, cardiovascular, and respiratory)
were measured on a high time-scale during baseline and reflection. Results showed
larger increases in self-reported negative affect, as compared to the control condition,
for all existential threat conditions, while there were no differences between the
control condition and threat conditions regarding positive affect, subjective arousal,
skin conductance, respiratory rate, and respiratory sinus arrythmia. There were subtle
differences between existential and non-existential threat conditions, most notably in
affective responses. Correlations showed positive associations between negative affect
and subjective arousal and between trait avoidance and subjective arousal. This study
is the first to systematically compare affective, subjective, and physiological changes in
arousal due to reflecting on different existential threats, as well as one non-existential
threat. We showed that, as compared to a control condition, reflecting on threats has a
large impact on negative affect, but no significant impact on positive affect, subjective
arousal, and physiological activation.
Keywords: existential threat, mortality salience, imagined, arousal, emotion, physiology
INTRODUCTION
A downside of the advanced human ability to think beyond the here and now is that we
can anticipate threatening scenarios that may occur (Sapolsky, 2004). Imagined and anticipated
threats have been defined as “cognitive representations of past stressful events or feared events
in the future” (Brosschot et al., 2010, p. 407) and are the hallmark of rumination and worry
(Meyer et al., 1990; Bergdahl and Bergdahl, 2002). Importantly, reflecting on and worrying about
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threats can elicit negative affect (Kirkegaard Thomsen, 2006),
self-reported arousal (Gould et al., 2015), and physiological
activation (e.g., increases in heart rate and skin conductance;
Brosschot et al., 2006). For example, the mere anticipation of
a social-evaluative threat e.g., giving an unexpected publicly-
evaluated speech, can elicit negative affect (i.e., anxiety),
increased subjective arousal, and sympathetic activation,
and decreased positive affect and parasympathetic activation
(Grossman and Wientjes, 2001, study 4; Dickerson and Kemeny,
2004; Gramer and Sprintschnik, 2008; Bouma et al., 2009; Childs
et al., 2010; Gramer et al., 2012; Poppelaars et al., 2019).
Our ability to think beyond the here and now also allows us
to fully comprehend harsh facts inherent to human existence:
that death is inevitable (i.e., mortality), that we are ultimately
alone in the world (i.e., isolation), that we are responsible
for everything we do (i.e., freedom), and that life has no
a priori meaning (i.e., meaning) (Yalom, 1980). There are some
theoretical accounts that predict that these existential threats
lead to increased negative affect and evoke subjective and
physiological arousal (Tritt et al., 2012; Jonas et al., 2014). The
empirical evidence for this theoretical claim, however, is limited.
First, it is unclear whether reflecting on the existential given
of mortality (i.e., mortality salience or MS) evokes changes
in negative or positive affect; with most studies finding null
effects (Lambert et al., 2014), whereas some studies only show
increases in specific negative emotions such as fear/anxiety
and sadness (Kastenbaum and Heflick, 2011; Lambert et al.,
2014), while other studies find increases in positive affect
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel et al., 1999) or increased
implicit tuning toward positive stimuli (DeWall and Baumeister,
2007; Kelley et al., 2014). Additionally, only three studies
have shown increases in heart rate (HR), skin conductance
(SC), and respiration rate, and decreases in parasympathetic
activity in the MS condition but also in the control condition
(eating or exam salience or dental pain), without significant
differences between conditions (Arndt et al., 2001b, unpublished,
mentioned in Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Arndt et al., 2001a, study
5; Klackl and Jonas, 2019), while another study showed lower
parasympathetic activation after MS reflection as compared to a
control condition (exam salience; Kosloff et al., 2008). Second,
experiments on reflecting on freedom restriction have found
increases in negative affect (specifically anger) (Dillard and Shen,
2005) as well as increases in HR but not in SC (Sittenthaler
et al., 2015; study 3, 2016); while more experienced freedom
is associated with an increased positive affect (Veenhoven,
2000). In contrast to MS and freedom restriction – which
have traditionally been manipulated through reflection tasks –
the physiological consequences of other existential threats,
such as uncontrollability and uncertainty, have only been
studied outside the field of social psychology and have typically
been manipulated through physical manipulations or motivated
performance tasks (i.e., performing a task, making a decision).
Third, uncontrollability threat has mainly been examined using
physical manipulations, especially with the anticipation of
uncontrollable aversive stimuli (e.g., electric shocks, aversive
tones, or photographs). This generally yields higher levels of
negative affect (specifically fear/anxiety and anger), HR, and
SC compared to controllable stimuli (Geer and Maisel, 1972;
Maier and Seligman, 1976; Szpiler and Epstein, 1976; Miller,
1979; Thompson, 1981; Maier and Watkins, 1998; Sullivan and
Lewis, 2003)1, although it doesn’t seem to change positive affect
(Henderson et al., 2012). Fourth, regarding uncertainty, it has
long been associated with feelings of anxiety (Hirsh et al., 2012;
Grupe and Nitschke, 2013), but it can also increase positive affect
sometimes (van den Bos, 2001; Wilson et al., 2005). Experiments
examining the physiological consequences of uncertainty have
been mainly focused on motivated performance situations.
For example, when deciding upon an ambivalent choice, SC
increased, which was mediated by self-reported uncertainty
(van Harreveld et al., 2009). Similarly, during a gambling task,
uncertainty (i.e., gambling on unknown probabilities) caused
greater SC responses than risk (i.e., known low probability
of winning) (FeldmanHall et al., 2016). To our knowledge,
there have been no studies on how physiological activation
changes as people reflect on isolation or meaning existential
threats. To summarize, while there is considerable evidence that
reflecting on certain existential threats elicits negative affect and
physiological arousal, most of the existential threats have not
received much attention so far, and no research has systematically
compared arousal responses to reflecting on different types of
existential threats.
The main goal of the current study was to compare
affective/subjective arousal/physiological responses elicited by
reflecting on different existential threats. Despite the variety
in existential threats and the debate about whether certain
existential threats elicit unique responses over others (e.g.,
Kirkpatrick and Navarrete, 2006; Pyszczynski et al., 2006),
research comparing multiple existential threats is lacking. To our
knowledge, this study is the first to systematically measure the
arousal responses to different existential threats. We compared
four existential threat conditions with one control condition
(TV salience): MS, freedom restriction, uncontrollability, and
uncertainty. Besides examining their unique effects, we also
combined all existential threat conditions into a single condition
and compared it with the control condition, to thereby examine
the general effect of existential threat. Additionally, since it has
been argued that all threat responses underlie a generalized,
evolutionarily primitive, anxiety system (Tritt et al., 2012),
and that those responses can be encapsulated by a general
process model (Jonas et al., 2014), we also compared the
existential threat conditions to a non-existential threat condition
by inducing social-evaluative threat (SET). Since the motivated
performance manipulation of SET is well-known to elicit negative
affect and arousal (Grossman and Wientjes, 2001; Gramer
and Sprintschnik, 2008; Bouma et al., 2009; Gramer et al.,
2012; Poppelaars et al., 2019), we used the reflection on SET
as a non-existential benchmark to compare to the existential
threat conditions. Based on the theory that all threats elicit
similar responses (Tritt et al., 2012; Jonas et al., 2014), we
expected the non-existential and existential threats to elicit
similar affective/subjective arousal/physiological responses.
1However, extreme uncontrollability can also lead to reduced SC because of learned
helplessness (Seligman, 1972; Gatchel and Proctor, 1976).
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Importantly, we took a more fine-grained approach to
investigating arousal than previous studies by measuring arousal
on a high time-scale over the whole course of threat reflection.
This is a novel approach, as previous existential threat research
only measured affect before and after threat reflection (Burke
et al., 2010; Lambert et al., 2014) or physiological activation
during threat reflection (Klackl and Jonas, 2019). Measuring
both physiological and subjective arousal on a high time-scale
is especially relevant since the dual process model of terror
management states that thoughts of mortality are suppressed
with a clear temporal sequence, i.e., (almost) immediate proximal
and delayed distal defenses against death anxiety (Pyszczynski
et al., 1999; Greenberg et al., 2000). Therefore, subjective arousal
increases in response to MS would (almost) immediately be
regulated by proximal defenses. In contrast, Lambert et al.
(2014) showed that MS does in fact elicit affective responses,
which can be captured by more specific measures that can
distinguish between different emotions. To test these contrasting
predictions, we measured physiological and subjective arousal
in a high time-scale as well as self-reported affect before and
after reflection and distinguished between general positive and
negative affect and between several specific negative emotions.
Specifically, besides using a questionnaire to measure general
positive and negative affect before and after reflection, we
used a content analysis of descriptions of thoughts during
threat reflection to measure the number of positive and
negative affect-related words, as well as three specific negative
emotions: anger, fear/anxiety, and sadness. We expected to
find larger increases in subjective arousal and more negative
affect in the existential threat conditions as compared to
the control condition, with each threat potentially evoking
specific negative emotions; with MS evoking fear/anxiety and
sadness (Lambert et al., 2014), freedom restriction evoking anger
(Dillard and Shen, 2005), uncontrollability evoking fear/anxiety
and anger (Thompson, 1981; Sullivan and Lewis, 2003), and
uncertainty evoking fear/anxiety (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013).
Regarding changes in positive affect, we expected MS and
uncertainty to evoke no changes or increases in positive
affect (Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel et al., 1999; van den
Bos, 2001; Hirsh et al., 2012; Lambert et al., 2014), freedom
restriction to evoke decreases in positive affect (Veenhoven,
2000), and uncontrollability to evoke no changes in positive
affect (Henderson et al., 2012). Additionally, we measured a large
variety of indices of physiological activation during reflection:
purely sympathetic activation (electrodermal using SC: Gutrecht,
1994; and cardiovascular using pre-ejection period: Cacioppo
et al., 1994) or partly sympathetic/parasympathetic activation
(HR and blood pressure: Cacioppo et al., 1994; respiratory
rate: Grossman, 1983), and purely parasympathetic activation
(respiratory sinus arrythmia: Cacioppo et al., 1994). We expected
to find increases in (partly) sympathetic activation and decreases
in parasympathetic activation in all existential threat conditions.
Moreover, we measured cardiac output (CO) and
total peripheral resistance (TPR), which, according to the
biopsychosocial (BPS) model of arousal regulation (Blascovich
and Tomaka, 1996; Blascovich, 2013) can differentiate between
“challenge” and “threat” motivational states. The BPS model
applies specifically to motivated performance situations,
proposing that when task-demands outweigh personal resources,
threat emerges, and when resources approach or exceed demands,
challenge emerges. Challenge is marked by increases in CO and
decreases in TPR, while threat is marked by increases in TPR
and decreases in CO (Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996; Blascovich,
2013). Although the reflection task we used in the current
research contains some elements of motivated performance (a
self-relevant goal) it is a less clear case of motivated performance
compared to the tasks that are typically used in this domain (e.g.,
a speech task). Therefore, we anticipated that the task would
yield only modest levels of task engagement (which is marked
by increased HR and decreased PEP), which would in turn
limit the interpretation of CO and TPR reactivity in terms of
challenge and threat. However, in the case of sufficient levels of
task-engagement (decreased PEP and increased HR), we explore
the existence of between-condition differences in challenge and
threat on the basis of CO and TPR.
Finally, since certain self-reported personality traits (e.g.,
high self-esteem and trait approach and low trait avoidance)
have been proposed to offer anxiety/arousal-buffering effects
when reflecting on threats (Greenberg et al., 1992; Leary and
Baumeister, 2000; Pyszczynski et al., 2004; Schmeichel et al., 2009;
Routledge et al., 2010), we also explored correlations between
self-reported personality traits and arousal responses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One-hundred-and-eighty-five young adults (25.8% male)
participated in the experiment. Participants were recruited
via social media and locally in the university area, with the
requirement that they were between 18 and 35 years of age and
spoke fluent German.
In total, 14 participants were excluded, either due to technical
difficulties (eight participants due to recording failure, and four
participants due to missing timing markers) or other reasons (one
participant became unwell, and one participant revealed not to
speak German fluently after all). Thus, the final sample contained
171 participants (26.3% male; 92.4% right-handed; mean age
of 22.4, with a standard deviation of 3.2), with 30 participants
in the MS condition, 28 participants in the freedom restriction
condition, 28 participants in the uncontrollability condition, 29
participants in the uncertainty condition, 28 participants in the
SET (i.e., non-existential threat) condition, and 28 participants
in the control condition (TV salience). To test for general
effects of threat with increased statistical power, all existential
threat conditions were also post-hoc combined into one threat
condition (n = 115).
Participants were compensated with course credits or €7 in
cash. The experiment was approved by the ethical committee of
the University of Salzburg.
Threat Manipulation
Participants were semi-randomly allocated to the different
conditions, based on the order that the participants were
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tested (by repeatedly cycling through a list of six conditions).
Participants read a short instruction on a computer screen, asking
them to think about a certain situation, as well as about the
emotions their thoughts evoked and what else they thought
would happen in the situation. The instructions were based on
the traditional mortality salience (MS) manipulation (Rosenblatt
et al., 1989), although in the current experiment participants first
reflected on the situation they had to recall during a physiological
recording period and only wrote down their answers afterward
(to prevent movement artifacts in the physiological data). The
wording of the MS instructions was subsequently adjusted to all
other conditions in order to be as similar as possible to each other,
only differing in the type of situation to reflect on.
Thus, in the MS condition, participants were asked to think
about their own death. In the freedom restriction condition,
participants were asked to think about a situation in their life
where they had not been free (i.e., a situation in which someone
else has forced them to either do something or to refrain
from doing something). In the uncontrollability condition,
participants were asked to think about the aspects of their life
that make them feel powerless and that implied lacking control to
influence important things in life. In the uncertainty condition,
participants were asked to think about the aspects of their life
that made them feel uncertain. In the SET condition, participants
were asked to imagine that they were about to give an improvised
socially-evaluated speech about their personality traits. Finally, in
the TV salience condition (the control condition), participants
were asked to think about watching television, which is a
commonly-used control condition in MS research (Greenberg
et al., 1994). The complete manipulation instructions can be
found in the Supplementary Material.
Procedure
An overview of the experimental procedure is displayed in
Figure 1. When participants arrived at the laboratory, they
provided informed consent and completed the self-reported
measures of personality traits on a computer, as well as a baseline
measure of self-reported positive/negative affect. Afterward,
participants were led to the physiology recording area, where
they were seated in front of a computer and attached to
the physiological measurement equipment. Participants first
practiced using the subjective arousal measure (see section
“Subjective Arousal During Reflection”), and the blood pressure
equipment was demonstrated. Then, a 3-min physiological
baseline recording was performed, during which participants
looked at a fixation cross on the screen while continuously
indicating their subjective arousal level. Following this, a single
blood pressure recording was taken as a baseline measurement.
Subsequently, participants read the manipulation instructions on
the screen and their blood pressure was again measured before
they started the reflection period of 3 min. While reflecting on
the instructed situation, participants looked at a fixation cross on
the screen, and continuously indicated their subjective arousal
levels. After the reflection period, blood pressure was measured
for a third and final time. Thereafter, participants completed
the positive/negative affect post-measure, as well as attention
checks (see section “Attention Checks”) where they wrote down
what they thought about during the reflection period. Finally,
participants were debriefed. The total duration of the experiment
was approximately 30 min.
Attention Checks
To check whether participants actually reflected on the instructed
situation during the 3-min reflection period, three questions were
asked. The first question was: “How well did you manage to
imagine the situation?” with a scale ranging from 1 (completely
not) to 5 (completely). On average, participants responded with
3.5 (between “moderate” and “well”). The second question was:
“Out of the 3 min that you had to think about the situation,
how much percent of the time did you actually think about the
situation?” ranging from 0 to 100%. On average, participants
responded with 69.2%. The third and final question was an open-
ended question: “Please describe shortly about what you thought
about.” These responses were used to analyze the emotional
content of the thoughts during the reflection period (see section
“Written Affect-Related Words”).
FIGURE 1 | Procedure. BP, blood pressure; Subj. arousal, subjective arousal; SC, skin conductance; ECG, electrocardiography; ICG, impedance cardiography.
Shaded areas indicate the physiological measurements.
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Self-Reported Positive/Negative Affect
After Reflection
To measure positive/negative affect, six subscales of the 12-point
core affect circumplex (Yik et al., 2011) were used: activated
pleasure (e.g., enthusiastic, elated), pleasant activation (e.g.,
energetic, excited), activation (e.g., aroused, activated), unpleasant
activation (e.g., frenzied, jittery), activated displeasure (e.g.,
distressed, upset), and displeasure (e.g., unhappy, dissatisfied). The
adjective format (translated to German) was used, with scales
ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (5). Since we were
interested in valence more generally and in order to reduce
the number of variables, we calculated a positive affect scale
by averaging the positively valenced subscales (i.e., activated
pleasure, pleasant activation) with a good internal consistency
(αpre = 0.85, αpost = 0.86), and a negative affect scale by averaging
the negatively valenced subscales (i.e., unpleasant activation,
activated displeasure, displeasure) with a good to excellent
internal consistency (αpre = 0.87, αpost = 0.92).
Written Affect-Related Words
As an exploratory additional measure of positive/negative affect,
we analyzed the written responses to the open-ended attention
check question (“Please describe shortly about what you thought
about”). The German 2001 dictionary (Wolf et al., 2008) of
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2015 software
(Pennebaker et al., 2001) was used to count the percentage of
affect-related words relative to all written words. Participants
responded with an average of 24 words (SD = 23.0), consisting on
average of 62% dictionary-recognized words (SD = 24.2). Since,
ideally, these analyses would be performed with at least 50 words2,
the results should be interpreted with caution. It should also
be kept in mind that negations of emotional words – e.g., not
happy – would also count as emotional words – in this case a
positive affect-related word.
We analyzed positive and negative affect-related words by
using all available emotional categories in the dictionary, which
have been shown to be sensitive to written emotions (Kahn et al.,
2007) and are commonly used (e.g., Dirkse et al., 2015). The
categories are the number of words related to positive emotion
(e.g., happy, pretty, good) and negative emotion (e.g., hate,
worthless, enemy), as well as three specific negative emotions:
anger (e.g., hate, kill, pissed), fear/anxiety (e.g., nervous, afraid,
tense), and sadness (e.g., grief, cry, sad).
Subjective Arousal During Reflection
To record subjective arousal on a high timescale during
both baseline and reflection, we used “CARMA”: software for
Continuous Affect Rating and Media Annotation (Girard, 2014).
The scale, which ranged from -100 (very calm) to 100 (very
aroused), was shown on the right side of a black screen
with a fixation cross. Participants were instructed to indicate
their current arousal level (without the instructions mentioning
valence) just before the baseline and reflection period, and then
to reassess this at least once every 15 s or whenever they felt that
2liwc.wpengine.com/how-it-works
their arousal level had changed. The average subjective arousal
was exported for every 10 s and averaged into 1-min bins.
Physiological Activation During
Reflection
Skin conductance, cardiovascular responses (electrocardiography
and impedance cardiography), and respiration were recorded
continuously using a 64-channel amplifier (TMSi, Oldenzaal,
Netherlands) and Polybench 1.22 (TMSi, Oldenzaal,
Netherlands) with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. The ground
electrode was situated on the non-dominant wrist.
Two software programs were used to analyze the physiological
measures (except for BP): first, the ANSLAB toolbox (V2.6;
Blechert et al., 2015) was used to analyze RR and RSA, the
results of which were exported for the last minute of baseline,
as well as for every minute of the reflection period. Secondly, the
PhysioData Toolbox (V0.3.3; Sjak-Shie, 2017) was used to analyze
all other measures (SC, PEP, HR, CO, TPR), the results of which
were exported for the last minute of baseline, as well as for every
30 s of the reflection period, which were subsequently averaged
into 1-min bins.
Skin Conductance (SC)
Two Ag/AgCl electrodes (MedCat, Netherlands) were attached
with Velcro bands to the inside of the medial phalanges of the
index and middle fingers of the participants’ non-dominant hand.
The hand rested on a pillow with the palm upwards. The area
bounded by the phasic signal and abscissa, divided by the epoch
duration (i.e., SC, in micro siemens per second), was calculated
automatically (Sjak-Shie, 2017).
Blood Pressure (BP)
Systolic and diastolic BP were measured from the non-dominant
upper-arm using an automatic blood pressure monitor (Ecomed
BU-90E, Medisana AG, Neuss, Germany), which was operated
by the experimenter after the baseline period and before and
after the reflection period. BP data preprocessing was performed
in SPSS 24 (IBM Corp, 2016). Mean arterial pressure (MAP, in
mmHg) was calculated with the formula: MAP = 2/3 diastolic
blood pressure + 1/3 systolic blood pressure (Sesso et al., 2000)
and used for all subsequent BP analyses.
Electrocardiography (ECG)
ECG was recorded using a two-lead unipolar modified chest
configuration with electrodes on the right collar bone and on the
lowest left rib. R-waves in the ECG were automatically detected
and manually checked, and heart rate (HR, in beats per minute)
was exported (Sjak-Shie, 2017).
Respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) was analyzed by spectral
analysis as the high frequency component of variation in inter-
beat intervals (i.e., high frequency heart-rate variability) within
the 0.14–0.5 Hz frequency band using fast Fourier transform
with the Welch algorithm (Welch, 1967). RSA values were log-
transformed (Blechert et al., 2015).
Respiration
Respiratory rate (RR, in cycles per minute) was assessed to
account for its potential confounding influence on RSA in
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within-subject reactivity analyses (Grossman and Taylor, 2007).
Respiration was recorded using inductive plethysmography
(SleepSense, S.L.P. Inc., IL, United States) at the thoracic
diaphragm. RR was calculated as 60 s divided by the continuously
measured breath duration.
Impedance Cardiography (ICG)
ICG signals were recorded using an eight-spot pairwise electrode
configuration. Pre-gelled adhesive electrodes were placed at the
neck and abdomen following the guidelines by Sherwood et al.
(1990). The distance between the two active electrodes was
measured and noted to be later used in the calculation of
cardiac output (CO).
The ICG signal was ensemble-averaged in synchrony with
the ECG R-wave (Sjak-Shie, 2017). The R- and C-points of the
inverted dZ/dt signal of ensemble-averaged beats were identified
automatically, while the Q-, B-, and X-points were identified
manually, based on offline-calculated derivatives of the ECG and
ICG signal (see the Supplementary Material for scoring details).
Pre-ejection period values (PEP, in milliseconds: for which
lower values represent increased ventricular contractility), mean
amplitude of baseline impedance (i.e., Z0, in Ohm), the
amplitude of the C- and B-points, and left ventricular ejection
time (i.e., LVET) values were exported. ICG data preprocessing
was performed in SPSS 24 (IBM Corp, 2016). Mean Z0 values
were averaged and used as a constant in the calculation of stroke
volume, for which we used the Kubicek formula (Kubicek et al.,
1966). CO (in liters per minute) was calculated by multiplying
HR and stroke volume. Total peripheral resistance (TPR, in
dyne-seconds·cm−5) was computed by dividing MAP by CO and
multiplying those values by 80 (Sherwood et al., 1990).
Self-Reported Personality Traits
The generalized approach- and avoidance-motivated personality
scales (Prentice, 2020) were used to measure whether high trait
avoidance (10 items, e.g., “When I’m faced with a decision, I am
afraid to make a mistake.”) and low trait approach (10 items, e.g.,
“On the whole I am more focused on reaching profits instead of
avoiding losses.”) would increase the impact of threats. Both the
trait avoidance (α = 0.87) and trait approach (α = 0.88) scales had
good internal consistency.
The Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was used
to explore whether low self-esteem would increase the impact
of threats. Besides the 10 original items (e.g., “On the whole,
I am satisfied with myself.”), an 11th general self-esteem item
was added: “I have high self-esteem.” The scale had acceptable
consistency overall (α = 0.74).
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were performed in RStudio version 1.1.456
(RStudio Team Inc., 2018) using R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team,
2018). Both the data and the used analysis scripts are freely
available via Mendeley Data (Poppelaars et al., 2020).
Reactivity (i.e., increases due to reflection) was calculated
using reflection minus baseline (Seraganian et al., 1985).
Specifically, for self-reported positive/negative affect, reactivity
was calculated for the post-reflection minus the pre-reflection
measure. For subjective arousal and physiological activity,
reactivity was calculated for each minute of reflection minus
the last minute of baseline. For blood pressure, reactivity
was calculated for the pre- and post-reflection measurement
minus the post-baseline measurement. This change score is a
straightforward and easily interpretable measure of change that
captures reactivity, independent of recovery.
Sixty-three percent of participants had at least one missing
value due to excessive noise, sensors losing contact, or recording
malfunctions. In order to retain statistical power, missing
data was handled using multiple imputation with the mice R
package (van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). Sixty-
three datasets were imputed, based on the rule of thumb that
at least as many datasets need to be imputed as the percentage
of incomplete cases (White et al., 2011). Missing values were
imputed by predictive mean matching within 100 iterations. Each
variable was predicted by other time points of the same measure
(ranging between 0 and 6 variables), as well as by condition,
age, sex, personality traits avoidance, approach, and self-esteem,
affect-related words (six variables), positive and negative affect
reactivity, subjective arousal reactivity during the third minute
of reflection, and physiological reactivity during the first minute
of reflection (eight variables, including BP pre-reflection, HR,
SC, PEP, RR, RSA, CO, and TPR); totaling between 23 and 29
predictor variables. Reactivity variables were passively imputed;
meaning that the reactivity values were not imputed directly but
calculated from the imputed data instead. Plausibility of imputed
variables was assessed using boxplots, strip plots, and density
plots, as well as summary statistics. All subsequent analyses were
performed for each of the imputed datasets and the resulting
estimates were pooled according to Rubin’s rules (Rubin, 2004).
There were 10 outliers in the data (based on Bonferroni-corrected
Grubbs’ tests; Grubbs, 1950), which were removed in advance in
order to be imputed (according to Schafer, 1997).
Before looking at reactivity, we checked whether there
were any between-condition differences at baseline, using
univariate ANOVAs with condition as a fixed factor. To assess
whether the threats induced significant reactivity, one-sample
t-tests against zero (i.e., no change) were used. To assess
differences between conditions, two-sample t-tests (based on
linear regressions) were used. Additionally, analyses of RSA
reactivity were repeated with linear regressions and RR as a
covariate, as recommended by Grossman and Taylor (2007).
Finally, we ran whole-sample exploratory Pearson correlations
between reactivity of positive/negative affect, subjective arousal,
physiological activation, and personality traits. Non-parametric
tests were used for the analyses of the written affect-related words,
due to the non-normal distribution of count data; using sign tests
to assess the significant presence of affect-related word categories,
and Mann–Whitney U tests to assess condition differences.
As an effect size, Cohen’s d is reported (except for the sign
tests for significant word counts). Additionally, Bayes factors
(with default uninformed priors) using the BayesFactor R package
(Morey and Rouder, 2018) were calculated (except for the non-
normally distributed written affect-related words) to complement
the frequentist statistics and clarify whether non-significant
findings should be interpreted as inconclusive or in support of
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FIGURE 2 | Self-reported affect before and after reflection within three aggregate conditions (existential threat composite, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience)
for: (A) positive effect, and (B) negative effect. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
the null hypothesis (Kass and Raftery, 1995). Our interpretation
of Bayes factors and their cutoffs was based on Kass and Raftery
(1995), specifically the cutoff for substantial evidence for the
null hypothesis (BF < 0.3125). Multiple comparison correction
was applied for all analyses using false-discovery rate (FDR;
Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001). FDR-corrected p-values smaller
than 0.05 were deemed significant. Both uncorrected and FDR-
corrected p-values are reported for transparency.
Power Analysis
A post-hoc statistical power calculation conducted with G∗Power
(Faul et al., 2007) showed that the final sample size offered 80%
power to detect changes in reactivity variables with medium
effect sizes (between d = 0.47 and d = 0.48) for individual
conditions and small effect sizes (d = 0.23) for the existential
threat composite. Additionally, the final sample size offered 80%
power to detect differences with the control condition with
medium-large effect sizes (between d = 0.75 and d = 0.77) for
individual conditions and with medium effect sizes (d = 0.60)
for the existential threat composite. Finally, the complete sample
size offered 80% power to detect correlations with small effect
sizes (d = 0.19). Additional use of Bayesian model comparison
offered the distinction between non-significant results due to lack
of power or due to support for the null hypothesis.
RESULTS
ANOVAs indicated no significant effect of condition or combined
existential threat conditions on any of the baseline values of
the dependent variables, uncorrected p’s > 0.096, FDR-corrected
p’s > 0.961.
Positive/Negative Affect After Reflection
Plots for the three aggregate conditions (existential threat
composite, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) can be
found in Figure 2 and plots for each separate condition can be
found in Supplementary Figure S1. An overview of the positive
and negative affect results can be found in Figures 3–5, with
detailed results in Supplementary Tables S1–S3.
Self-reported positive affect decreased from before to after
the manipulation in all conditions except for the SET condition,
which did not change. This decrease was not more pronounced in
the threat conditions than in the TV salience condition: Only the
freedom restriction condition did not differ from the TV salience
condition, while all other conditions had inconclusive results. All
separate existential threat conditions (including the existential
threat composite) showed larger decreases in positive affect than
the SET condition.
Self-reported negative affect increased in the freedom
restriction, uncontrollability, and uncertainty conditions, as well
as for the existential threat composite, and these increases
exceeded those seen in the TV salience condition. In the TV
salience condition itself, negative affect did not change, while
the MS and SET conditions had inconclusive results. The
uncontrollability condition showed larger increases in negative
affect than the SET condition, while the MS condition did not
differ from the SET condition.
Written Affect-Related Words
An overview of the written affect-related word results can be
found in Figures 3–5, with detailed results in Supplementary
Tables S1–S3. Plots of the results can be found in Figure 6.
Results showed that participants in all conditions reported
positive and negative affect-related thoughts, which significantly
differed from zero, though only the MS condition and combined
existential threat conditions reported more negative affect-related
thoughts than the control condition or the SET condition.
For anger-related thoughts, only the combined existential
threat conditions significantly reported anger, although this could
not be compared to the control or SET conditions due to a lack
of observations.
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FIGURE 3 | Results of one sample t-tests of reactivity comparing separate conditions against zero. Cohen’s d effect sizes are displayed for all variables except for
word-related variables, which show S values instead. Colors represent significant p-values after FDR-correction (in blue), substantial Bayesian evidence for the null
hypothesis (in orange), or inconclusive results (in off-white). The existential threat column is a composite of the first four columns. SC, skin conductance; HR, heart
rate; PEP, pre-ejection period; BP, blood pressure; RSA, respiratory sinus arrhythmia; RR, respiratory rate; CO, cardiac output; TPR, total peripheral resistance.
For fear/anxiety-related thoughts, the MS and uncertainty
conditions and the existential threat composite significantly
reported fear/anxiety, though none reported more fear/anxiety
than the control or SET conditions.
For sadness-related thoughts, the MS and uncontrollability
conditions and the existential threat composite significantly
reported sadness, though only the MS condition and the
existential threat composite reported significantly more sadness
than the SET condition, and only the MS condition also reported
more sadness than the control condition.
Subjective Arousal During Reflection
An overview of the subjective arousal results can be found
in Figures 3–5, with detailed results in Supplementary Tables
S1–S3. A plot for the three aggregate conditions (existential
threat composite, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) can
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FIGURE 4 | Results of two sample t-tests of reactivity comparing separate conditions against the control condition (TV salience). Cohen’s d effect sizes are
displayed. Colors represent significant p-values after FDR-correction (in blue), substantial Bayesian evidence for the null hypothesis (in orange), or inconclusive
results (in off-white). The existential threat column is a composite of the first four columns. SC, skin conductance; HR, heart rate; PEP, pre-ejection period; BP, blood
pressure; RSA, respiratory sinus arrhythmia; RR, respiratory rate; CO, cardiac output; TPR, total peripheral resistance.
be found in Figure 7A and a plot for each separate condition can
be found in Supplementary Figure S2. Additionally, Figure 7B
illustrates the subjective arousal responses for every 10 s of
reflection for each separate condition.
Subjective arousal increased in all conditions for
each minute of the reflection. However, the magnitude
of these increases was not significantly higher for the
threatening conditions than for the TV salience condition.
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FIGURE 5 | Results of two sample t-tests of reactivity comparing existential threat conditions against the social-evaluative threat condition. Cohen’s d effect sizes are
displayed. Colors represent significant p-values after FDR-correction (in blue), substantial Bayesian evidence for the null hypothesis (in orange), or inconclusive
results (in off-white). The existential threat column is a composite of the first four columns. SC, skin conductance; HR, heart rate; PEP, pre-ejection period; BP, blood
pressure; RSA, respiratory sinus arrhythmia; RR, respiratory rate; CO, cardiac output; TPR, total peripheral resistance.
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FIGURE 6 | Written affect-related words within all conditions (mortality salience, freedom restriction, uncontrollability, uncertainty, existential threat composite,
social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) for: (A) positive affect-related words, (B) negative affect-related words, (C) anger-related words, (D) fear/anxiety-related
words, and (E) sadness-related words. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 7 | Subjective arousal over time within (A) three aggregate conditions (existential threat composite, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) for every 60 s
of reflection, and (B) all separate conditions (mortality salience, freedom restriction, uncontrollability, uncertainty, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) for every 10
s of reflection. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
There was substantial Bayesian evidence for no differences
between the SET condition and freedom condition during minute
two and between the SET condition and the uncontrollability




An overview of the physiological activation results can be
found in Figures 3–5, with detailed results in Supplementary
Tables S1–S3. Plots for the three aggregate conditions (existential
threat composite, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) can
be found in Figure 8 and plots for each separate condition can be
found in Supplementary Figure S3.
Results showed significant increases in SC (i.e., sympathetic
electrodermal activity) in the existential threat composite during
the first minute of reflection, although there was inconclusive
evidence for larger increases in SC compared to the control
or SET condition. Additionally, all combined existential threat
conditions showed significant increases in RR (i.e., partly-
sympathetic respiratory activity) during the first and last minute
of reflection, as well as for the uncertainty condition in the
last minute and for the SET condition during the second
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FIGURE 8 | Physiological activation over time within three aggregate conditions (existential threat composite, social-evaluative threat, and TV salience) for: (A) mean
blood pressure, (B) heart rate, (C) skin conductance, (D) pre-ejection period, (E) respiratory rate, (F) respiratory sinus arrhythmia, (G) cardiac output, and (H) total
peripheral resistance. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
minute, though again there was either inconclusive evidence
or substantial evidence for no differences compared to the
control or SET condition. Finally, RSA (i.e., parasympathetic
cardiovascular activity) showed significant decreases during
the first minute (uncertainty condition and the existential
threat composite), second minute (uncertainty condition and
the existential threat composite), and the third minute of
reflection (freedom restriction and uncertainty conditions, and
the existential threat composite); which did not change when
correcting for RR reactivity for the first and second minute,
although the effect disappeared for the freedom restriction
and uncertainty conditions for the third minute; again there
was either inconclusive evidence or substantial evidence for
no differences in RSA reactivity compared to the control
or SET condition.
All other physiological measures (BP, HR, PEP, CO, TPR)
largely showed substantial evidence for no changes and
no differences between individual conditions compared to
the control condition or the SET condition, with some
inconclusive results.
Correlations
An overview of the correlation results between reactivity of self-
reported affect, subjective arousal, physiological activation, and
personality traits can be found in Figure 9, with detailed results
in Supplementary Table S4. Plots of the interesting significant
correlations can be found in Figure 10.
Results showed interesting medium-strength positive
associations between negative affect reactivity and subjective
arousal reactivity (for minutes two and three), as well as between
trait avoidance and subjective arousal reactivity (for minutes
two and three). Additionally, as could be expected, there were
associations with large effect sizes between the three different
minutes of subjective arousal, and between the trait self-esteem
and traits avoidance and approach (though not between traits
avoidance and approach itself).
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FIGURE 9 | Correlations between reactivity of self-reported affect, subjective arousal, physiological activation, and personality traits. Cohen’s d effect sizes are
displayed. Colors represent significant p-values after FDR-correction (in blue), substantial Bayesian evidence for the null hypothesis (in orange), or inconclusive
results (in off-white). SC, skin conductance; HR, heart rate; PEP, pre-ejection period; BP, blood pressure; RSA, respiratory sinus arrhythmia; RR, respiratory rate; CO,
cardiac output; TPR, total peripheral resistance.
Notably, there was either inconclusive evidence or substantial
evidence for no associations between physiological activity and
affect/subjective arousal/traits.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether reflecting
on (existential) threats elicits changes in self-reported affect,
subjective arousal, and physiological activation, and whether
these changes differ from a control condition (TV salience). As
hypothesized, results indicated that reflection elicited increases in
negative affect, subjective arousal, (partly) sympathetic activation
(SC, RR) and decreases in positive affect and parasympathetic
activation (RSA). However, while the existential threat conditions
evoked larger increases in negative affect than the control
condition did, the threat and control conditions did not differ
in terms of changes in positive affect, subjective arousal, or
physiological activation. Therefore, we conclude that reflecting
on threats in particular has a large impact on negative affect,
but no significant impact on positive affect, subjective arousal, or
physiological activation.
Our arousal results are in line with previous research showing
that reflecting on existential threats evokes large increases
in negative affect (Kastenbaum and Heflick, 2011; Lambert
et al., 2014), as well as small increases in electrodermal
sympathetic activation (SC) and partly sympathetic respiratory
activation (RR), and small decreases in parasympathetic activity
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FIGURE 10 | Scatterplots of significant correlations for (A) negative affect and subjective arousal (min 2), (B) negative affect and subjective arousal (min 3), (C) trait
avoidance and subjective arousal (min 2), and (D) trait avoidance and subjective arousal (min 3). Pearson correlation coefficients and FDR-corrected p-values are
displayed. The first imputed dataset is used for illustrative purposes. The 95% confidence interval is displayed in the shaded gray area, and the linear regression line
is displayed in black.
(e.g., Miller, 1979; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Arndt et al., 2001a;
Kosloff et al., 2008; Sittenthaler et al., 2016; Klackl and Jonas,
2019), with no differences between the threat and control
condition as found in most research manipulating MS through
reflection (Miller, 1979; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Arndt et al.,
2001a; Klackl and Jonas, 2019) but unlike the common physical
manipulations of uncontrollability (Geer and Maisel, 1972;
Szpiler and Epstein, 1976; Miller, 1979) or the performance
tasks manipulating uncertainty (van Harreveld et al., 2009;
FeldmanHall et al., 2016). Since our task was a reflection task and
we modeled all manipulations onto the structure of a typical MS
manipulation, it makes sense that our results are more in line with
previous MS research.
The current study extends the literature on affect and
physiological activation by also measuring subjective arousal
during reflection on a high time-scale. The subjective arousal
responses showed large increases during threat reflection,
although these did not differ from the control condition.
These results demonstrate an absence of arousal suppression
due to proximal defenses, as would be predicted by the
dual defense model of terror management (Pyszczynski et al.,
1999; Greenberg et al., 2000). Interestingly, although both the
subjective arousal and affective measures were self-reported
and the physiological activation measures were objective, the
subjective arousal results largely mirrored the physiological
responses instead of the affective responses. It can be questioned
why our results showed divergent evidence for changes in
negative affect on the one hand, and subjective and physiological
arousal measures on the other hand. Although it has long
been assumed that affective and physiological responses are
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associated (Lindsley, 1951; Darwin, 1965), it is in fact a common
finding within stress research that affective responses are not
associated with physiological responses (Campbell and Ehlert,
2012). This might be due to measuring the subjective arousal
and physiological activation on a similar time-scale during
the reflection task and the affective responses only before and
after the task (Barrett, 1997; Hellhammer and Schubert, 2012),
or due to the complex associations that exist between stress
response systems, depending – among other things – on threat
type, threat interpretation, and on the baseline state, gender,
menstrual cycle, and personality of the participant (Poppelaars
et al., 2019). Therefore, we conclude that it is not completely
unexpected to find large changes in negative affect due to
threat reflection but only small changes in subjective arousal or
physiological activation.
The MS condition differed from the other threat conditions
in terms of its sensitivity to the two measures of self-reported
affect. Participants in the MS condition showed inconclusive
changes in negative affect after reflection, with no significantly-
larger increases in negative affect than in the control condition.
This lack of affective responses has also been found in previous
MS studies and forms the basis of the “affect-free claim” (Lambert
et al., 2014). However, this is in contrast with the results of the
content analysis of the written words describing the thoughts
during the reflection period. By analyzing these written thoughts,
it was found that the MS condition evoked significantly more
negative emotions – specifically sadness – than the control
condition. Similarly, mainly sadness, as well as anxiety, were
found in a previous study’s descriptions of thoughts during MS
(Kastenbaum and Heflick, 2011). On the one hand, this contrast
might be due to the specificity of the measures; while negative
affect was very generally defined, written affect-related words
could distinguish between three specific negative emotions.
According to Lambert et al. (2014), the affect-free claim has
resulted from a lack of specificity of measured emotions, whereas
the specific measurement of the emotions fear and sadness do
increase notably during MS. On the other hand, this contrast
might be due to the timing of the affect measurements: whereas
negative/positive affect was measured right after the reflection
period, affect-related words were only measured at the end of the
experiment (i.e., distally), when death thoughts might already be
outside of focal attention but are still easily accessible according to
the dual process model of terror management (Pyszczynski et al.,
1999; Greenberg et al., 2000). Indeed, it has previously been found
that negative affect after MS is only increased when measured
distally; which is thought to be caused by emotion suppression
via proximal defenses (Routledge et al., 2010). However, since
the act of writing about thoughts during the reflection brings
death-related thoughts back into focal attention, this possible
explanation can be considered refuted. Thus, it seems likely that
the lack of larger increases in negative affect as compared to the
control condition are not due to timing influences, but rather due
to emotion specificity, since the MS condition did indeed write
more sadness-related words than the control condition.
Considering associations between changes in affect, subjective
arousal, physiological activation, and personality traits, we found
no associations with physiological reactivity. Our results did show
medium-strength associations between higher trait avoidance
and larger increases in subjective arousal, which in turn were
related to increased negative affect. This is consistent with several
studies showing that those who use more avoidance coping
tend to feel more stressed (Holahan and Moos, 1986; Holahan
et al., 2005). Therefore, further research on threat reflection
with vulnerable populations would be interesting, such as those
with avoidant personality disorder and those that heavily rely on
avoidant emotion regulation.
To answer the main question of the study – whether reflecting
on (existential) threat evokes negative affect, subjective arousal,
and physiological activation – our results indicated that brief
episodes of reflecting on existential givens do elicit large increases
in negative affect, even when compared to a control condition.
Threat reflection also evoked small decreases in positive affect,
increases in subjective arousal, and changes in physiological
activation, but these changes were not higher than those seen in a
non-threatening control condition.
Another aim of the current study was to compare the
arousal responses elicited by reflecting on four different
existential threats: mortality salience (MS), freedom restriction,
uncontrollability, and uncertainty; and one non-existential
threat: social-evaluative threat (SET). Although all threat
conditions showed similar patterns overall, there were subtle
differences between the existential threat conditions and the
non-existential threat condition, most notably in terms of affect.
Specifically, regarding negative affect: whereas all existential
threats (except for MS) showed increases in negative affect
and the MS condition reported more negative affect- and
sadness-related thoughts, SET showed inconclusive changes
in negative affect and specific affect-related words; with the
uncontrollability condition even showing larger increases in
negative affect as compared to the SET condition and the MS
condition reporting more negative affect- and sadness-related
thoughts than the SET condition. Regarding positive affect:
whereas all existential threats showed decreases in positive affect,
SET showed no change in positive affect, with all existential
threats showing larger decreases in positive affect as compared to
SET. Overall, we posit that the theory that all threats (i.e., both
existential and non-existential) cause similar arousal responses
(Tritt et al., 2012; Jonas et al., 2014) was partially supported;
because even though there were subtle differences in affective
responses between reflecting on different threats, all threat
conditions did show similar large increases in subjective arousal
as well as medium-strength changes in the same directions for
physiological activation (i.e., increases in skin conductance and
respiratory rate and decreases in respiratory sinus arrhythmia),
with those changes all not being significantly different from
those in the control condition. Thus, people experience similar
levels of arousal after reflecting on both existential and non-
existential threats, as proposed by the general process model
of threat and defense (Jonas et al., 2014), but there are some
differences between existential and non-existential threats on a
descriptive level. Indeed, as the current study is the first study
to systematically compare different (existential) threats, more
research is needed, and replication of our results is warranted in
order to confirm our conclusion.
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The current study also has several limitations. First, the
sample size of the individual conditions was small (ranging
from 28 to 30 participants), restricting our statistical power
and thus our confidence in the results. Specifically, a post-hoc
power analysis showed that we only had sufficient statistical
power to detect arousal changes with medium effect sizes and
condition differences with medium-large effect sizes, which
might not be sufficient for the typically-small affective changes
caused by MS (e.g., Burke et al., 2010). This was noticeable
in the large number of non-significant results that showed
inconclusive Bayesian evidence; and thus, these inconclusive
results should be further investigated in future well-powered
studies. However, with the use of the existential threat composite
(115 participants), our statistical power increased and was able
to detect arousal changes with small effect sizes and condition
differences with medium effect sizes, which also showed a smaller
number of inconclusive results. Secondly, we only used self-
reported measures of positive/negative affect, and hence, these
measures could be biased by socially-desirable responding and
consistency seeking (Paulhus and Vazire, 2007). Indeed, it is
possible that the increase in negative affect after existential threat
can be explained by the experimental demands. Additionally,
the increase in negative affect-related words is to be expected
when writing about an objectively-negative situation such as an
existential threat. However, this alternative explanation cannot
explain the different timelines of each condition of our more fine-
grained subjective arousal measure, which was also self-reported-
although this measure was underpowered and thus did not find
differences between conditions. Third, because of the relatively
passive nature of the reflection task, we anticipated only modest
levels of task-engagement. However, since we found no evidence
for sufficient task-engagement based on cardiovascular measures,
this precluded a further interpretation of cardiovascular reactivity
in terms of motivational states of challenge and threat. Although
the current task carries some aspects of motivated performance
(i.e., a self-relevant goal), the task was not strong enough to
elicit clear task-engagement. In future research, the task could
be slightly adapted, for example by including the expectation
that one has to verbally report on the situation later (see
Mendes et al., 2002), allowing a threat/challenge analysis of
different types of existential threats. Fourth and final, we grouped
freedom restriction as an existential threat, although it can be
debated whether this can actually be viewed as a threat to
one’s meaningful existence. On the one hand, although the four
existential concerns of Yalom (1980) do include freedom, this is
defined more in terms of responsibility. In reactance theory, on
the other hand, freedom is always defined with regard to specific
situations, so Brehm and Brehm (1981) did not consider freedom
to be an existential threat. Others, however, do classify freedom
restriction as an existential threat (Koole et al., 2006), which we
also did for simplicity.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the current study was the first to systematically
compare affective, subjective, and physiological changes in
arousal due to reflecting on different existential threats,
as well as one non-existential threat. We showed that, as
compared to a control condition, reflecting on threats has a
large impact on negative affect, but no significant impact on
positive affect, subjective arousal, and physiological activation.
All threats caused similar responses overall, with the only
notable differences between existential and non-existential
threats regarding affective responses.
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